Multisignatures allow n signers to produce a short joint signature on a single message. Multisignatures were achieved in the plain model with a non-interactive protocol in groups with bilinear maps, by Boneh et al [4] , and by a three-round protocol under the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption, by Bellare and Neven [3], with multisignature verification cost of, respectively, O(n) pairings or exponentiations. In addition, multisignatures with O(1) verification were shown in so-called Key Verification (KV) model, where each public key is accompanied by a short proof of well-formedness, again either with a non-interactive protocol using bilinear maps, by Ristenpart and Yilek [15], or with a three-round protocol under the Diffie-Hellman assumption, by Bagherzandi and Jarecki [1] .
INTRODUCTION
A multisignature protocol allows a group of n players to sign a common message in such a way that instead of n separate signatures the players produce a short string, called a multisignature, which can be then verified against the set of the public keys of these n players. Such scheme provides advantages over standard signatures if the size of the multisignature is that of a single standard signature rather than n signatures, and even more so if the verification efficiency is comparable to single signature verification instead of n signature verifications. Applications of multisignatures include cases where the set of signers is small, e.g. distribution of certificate authorities, or authentication of routes in mobile networks, but potential applications can also include large sets of signers, e.g. in aggregation of broadcast acknowledgements, where it is especially beneficial to reduce both multisignature size and verification time. Rogue Key Attacks, KOSK Assumption. Multisignature protocols based on various signature schemes are possible because of homomorphic properties of arithmetic operations involved in signature algorithms. For example, a BLS signature [5] on message m under public key yi = g x i is σi = H(m) x i . Therefore a multisignature σ can be created as σ = σ1 * ... * σn, and it can be verified under the combined public key y = y1 * ... * yn because DL(g, y) = DL(H(m), σ). However, the same homomorphic properties often enable so-called "rouge key attacks" on such schemes. For example, if an adversary picks public key y2 = g x /y1 for some y1 and any chosen x, he can then issue valid multisignatures under keys {y1, y2}. Micali et al [12] showed how to avoid such rogue key attacks under so-called "Knowledge of Secret Key" (KOSK) assumption, which requires the adversary to essentially provide a secret key for every public key it chooses. Key Verification or Registration Models. Micali et al implemented the KOSK assumption via an interactive pre-processing protocol involving all potential signers [12] . However, it can also be implemented in a Key Verification (KV) model [1] , where each key yi admitted in a multisignature verification procedure must be accompanied by a valid proof of well-formedness πi, e.g. if πi's are non-interactive concurrently extractable proofs of secret key knowledge. A version of this model was introduced by Ristenpart and Yilek [15] as a Key Registration (KR) model for PKI, which stipulates that a Certification Authority (CA) can certify a public key only if its owner passes certain registration procedure. The KR model thus shifts the proof verification overhead from multisignature verifiers to the CA's. (However, as we explain below, the KR model requires non-standard trust assumptions on CA's.) Prior Work Related to DL-based Multisignatures. Multisignature schemes proven secure in the KR model in [15] use noninteractive proofs of key well-formedness and hence they are secure also in the KV model. Technically, the non-interactive proofs used by the schemes of [15] are not concurrently extractable proofs of knowledge. Instead, they are NIZK proofs of DL equality, called "proofs of secret key possession" in [15] , which do not guarantee efficient concurrent witness extraction, yet they turn out to suffice for security of multisignatures based on the Gap Diffie-Hellman (DH) assumption [15] or on Computational or Decisional DH assumptions in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [1] , following a general paradigm of replacing proofs of knowledge (e.g. of discrete logarithm) with proofs of computational ability (e.g. of correct exponentiation of a challenge), used e.g. in [17] . However, this paradigm seems to yield only schemes secure under assumptions related to the DH assumption, and not the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption. Thus, to implement DL-based multisignatures in the KV model, one seemingly needs to resort to concurrently extractable zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZKPK) of discrete logarithm. Such proofs remain impractical in the standard model (e.g. [8] ), but in ROM, due to the results of Fischlin [9] , concurrent ZKPK's of DL can be achieved in a way that is arguably efficient enough if these ZKPK's are verified by CA's, but less so if they are attached to certificates and verified by multisignature receivers as part of certificate verification. (In practice they seem to require about 10 times more bandwidth and computation than standard ROM-based NIZK's.) However, note that trusting the CA's to perform proof verifications places non-standard trust assumptions on CA's, because all CA's must be trusted to perform those checks. In particular, a multisignature in the KR model becomes insecure if a key of a single participant in multisignature generation is certified by an untrustworthy CA. It has been an open problem whether standard ROM-based NIZK of DL, e.g. (r, s) s.t. g s = ry H(y,r) can be used instead of Fischlin's NIZK's to implement the KOSK assumption, thus leading to efficient multisignatures in the KV model.
Multisignatures have also been proposed in the standard PKI setting using groups with bilinear maps by Boneh et al [4, 2] , and under the DL assumption by Bellare and Neven [3] , but the multisignature verification in these schemes requires O(n) pairings or exponentiations, respectively. Moreover, the DL-based scheme of [3] requires 3 rounds of interaction, which makes the scheme less convenient for applications where multisignature generation could be piggybacked on a 2-round application protocol, e.g. aggregation of authentication in route discovery (see e.g. [11] ) or aggregation of acknowledgments to a broadcast (see e.g. [6] ).
Our Results
We provide two new multisignature schemes based on the DL assumption, both with two-round protocols. The first scheme (Section 4.2) is secure in the KV model, formally defined in Section 2. It improves on a scheme implied by Micali et al [12] and Fischlin's NIZKs [9] by using standard ROM-based NIZK of DL as a proof of key well-formedness, thus reducing its size and verification time to a minimum, and settling the open question mentioned above. Moreover, the exact security of our scheme matches (in ROM) that of standard DL-based signatures by Schnorr [16] , as given by the forking lemma analysis of Pointcheval and Stern [14] . Such exact security seems unlikely to hold for the scheme implied by the results of [12, 9] . Our second scheme (Section 6) is secure in the plain model and uses O(n) exponentiations in verification, but improves on the scheme of [3] by reducing the protocol rounds to two, which seems minimal for DL-based schemes, while also preserving the same exact security as that of Schnorr signatures.
Our schemes have several other convenient features: (1) A signer can concurrently engage in any number of multisignature instances; (2) A signer doesn't need to know the keys of other participating signers; (3) The message to be signed can be provided in the second (last) protocol round, which is fast on-line; (4) Both schemes use standard DL-based keys and can safely reuse for example the keys used for Schnorr or DSS signatures.
These results are enabled by two contributions of general interest. The low round complexity of both schemes is due to a new multiplicatively homomorphic equivocable commitment scheme (Section 4). As shown by Damgard [7] , equivocable commitments due to Pedersen [13] imply a practical 3-round straight-line simulatable ZKPK of DL in the CRS model. Our commitment scheme can play the same role but it in addition it allows aggregation of n instances of such proofs, thus compacting them to allow a short multisignature, with an efficient reduction enabled by straight-line simulatability of the proof system. (We note that our commitment scheme provides only restricted equivocability, but enough for straight-line simulation of ZKPK of DL.) Secondly, short proofs of key wellformedness in our KV model scheme are enabled by a generalized forking lemma (Section 3), which shows that witnesses to polynomially many instances of standard ROM-based NIZK's can be efficiently simultaneously extracted after adversary ends its execution (as opposed to on-line extraction in Fischlin's NIZK's). This implies that any DL-based multisignature secure under the KOSK assumption is secure in the KV model in ROM when standard ROMbased NIZK's are used as proofs of key well-formedness. An expected polynomial-time post-execution extraction of all witnesses in such proofs was previously shown by Jens Groth in [10] , so our contribution is a strict polynomial-time extraction procedure which matches up to an O(n 2 ) factor, where n is the number of proof instances, the time/probability bounds given by the Bellare-Neven version [3] of the Pointcheval-Stern forking lemma [14] . Notation and Setting. We use G to denote a multiplicative group of prime order q. All arithmetic operations are either done modulo q, when involving elements in Zq, or they are operations in G.
MULTISIGNATURE SCHEMES
A Multisignature Syntax. We define a multisignature scheme in the key verification model as a tuple MS = (Setup, KGen, MSign, Vrfy, KVrfy) where Setup, KGen, Vrfy and KVrfy are efficient probabilistic algorithms, and MSign is a distributed protocol s.t.
• par ← Setup(1 κ ), on input the security parameter κ generates public parameters par.
• (sk, pk, π) ← KGen(par), executed by each user on input par, generates this user's secret key sk, the corresponding public key pk, and a proof of validity of this public key, denoted π.
• MSign is a multisignature protocol executed by a group of players who intend to sign the same message m. Each player Pi executes this protocol on public inputs par, message m and private input ski, his secret key. The output of the protocol is a multisignature denoted σ.
• {0, 1} ← Vrfy(par, m, PKSet, σ) verifies whether σ is a valid multisignature on message m on be half of the set of the players whose public keys are in the set PKSet.
• {0, 1} ← KVrfy(par, pk, π) verifies whether pk is a valid key, given the proof π.
This set of procedures must satisfy the following completeness properties: Let par ← Setup(1 κ ). First, for any tuple (sk, pk, π) outputted by KGen(par), KVrfy(par, pk, π) = 1. Second, for
Run A(par, pk * , π * ), and for every signature query m made by A do the following:
List ← List ∪ {m}; Execute procedure MSign on inputs (par, m, sk * ), forwarding messages to and from A.
(We allow A to make any number of such queries concurrently.)
When A halts, parse its output as (m, σ, {(pk2, π2), (pk3, π3), ..., (pkn, πn)}). Set PKSet = {pk * } ∪ {pk2, pk3, ..., pkn}.
If (KVrfy(par, pki, πi) = 1 for all i = 2 to n) ∧ (m ∈ List) ∧ (Vrfy(par, m, PKSet, σ) = 1) then return 1, otherwise return 0. .n one generates (ski, pki, πi) by running KGen(par) and executes MSign on input par, m, and ski, then assuming that all messages between these players are delivered correctly, each player outputs the same string σ that moreover satisfies
Remarks on the assumptions behind the syntax: (1) In the security game in figure 1 we take a simplifying assumption that the Setup procedure is executed by an honest party. However, the public parameters in our two schemes are only needed to define a multiplicative group of prime order where the DL assumption holds, and such parameters can be chosen by any party.
(2) The syntax of a multisignature scheme in the KV model is a simplification of the syntax used by [15] , which models potentially interactive key registration processes. Here we only allow noninteractive proofs πi of well-formedness of key yi. Such proofs can be verified either by CA's as part of the key registration process (as in the KR model of [15] ) or by multisignature verifiers, e.g. together with validation of a PKI certificate on yi. (3) If the proof of validity of the public key is set to empty string and the algorithm KVrfy just returns true, then the above definition is equivalent to the definition of the multisignature schemes in the plain model as proposed in [3] . (4) Unlike in the definition of multisignatures used by [12] and [3] , we do not require the set of participant identities and/or the set of their public keys as inputs to the multisignature protocol. The participating players must be aware of one another in the protocol execution, but this information is needed only to ensure proper communication, and does not need to be part of the inputs to the cryptographic protocol. The schemes secure in this setting provide additional flexibility to applications of multisignatures; because in many applications a signer might care only about the message it is signing and not about the identities of the other signers. (Otherwise they can always include the list of participating players in the signed message.) In such applications protocols of [12, 3] would have to be preceded by an additional communication round where participants broadcast their identities and/or keys. Multisignature security in Key Verification model. As in previous works on multisignatures, e.g. [12, 3, 15] , we define security of a multisignature scheme as universal unforgeability under a chosen message attack against a single honest player. Namely we define the adversarial advantage of A against the multisignature scheme MS = (Setup, KGen, MSign, Vrfy, KVrfy) as a probability that experiment Exp 
where the probability goes over the random coins of the adversary and all the randomness used in the experiment. We call a multisignature scheme (t, ǫ, n, qs)-secure if it holds that Adv uu−cma MS (A) ≤ ǫ for every adversary A, that runs in time at most t, makes at most qs signature queries and produces forgeries on behalf of n parties. In random oracle model we also consider a notion of a (t, ǫ, n, qs, q h )-secure multisignature scheme where A is an adversary restricted to at most q h hash queries and the probability in the experiment Exp uu−cma MS (A) is taken over random hash functions. We note that in [12] and [3] the notion of CMA forgery is broader than the one we consider above: As we pointed out in remark (4) above, their signers take as input the set of public keys of all participating players PKSet along with the message m as input. Moreover, their notion of multisignature security treats the multisignature effectively as a signature on a pair (m, PKSet): Their notion of forgery is extended to include a case where an attacker forges a multisignature on a message that was previously signed by the honest player, but it was signed together with a different set of public keys. In our model, such adversary would not be considered a successful forger. However, a scheme secure according to our notion implies a scheme secure in this stronger model if every message m input into our multisignature protocol is simply amended by the set of public keys PKSet.
GENERALIZED FORKING LEMMA
Consider an experiment in which an adversary A, on input par, interacts with a random oracle H : {0, 1} * → Zq. Denote the randomness involved in this execution as f = (ρ, h1, h2, ...., hq h ), where ρ is A's random input, hj is the j-th response of H, and q h is the maximum number of hash queries A makes. Let Ω denote the set of all vectors f . The probability in all experiments we consider goes over f ∈ Ω, unless noted otherwise. We consider as adversary's success an event that A outputs a pair (J, {φj }j∈J ) where J is a (non-empty) set of up to n indexes J ⊆ {1, ..., q h }. By convention we assume that if A fails then it outputs (J, {φj }j∈J ) s.t. J = ∅. Otherwise we assume that |J| = n, by treating J as a multiset and allowing repetitions, and we assume that if J = {j1, ..., jn} then j1 ≤ ... ≤ jn. For fixed par, let S ⊆ Ω be the set of vectors f s.t. A(par, f ) succeeds, and let ǫ = Pr [S] . Denote the index set J output by A(par, f ) on f ∈ S as Ind(f ). Let fj = (ρ, h1, ..., hj−1), e.g. f1 = ρ, f2 = (ρ, h1), etc. The forking lemma of Pointcheval and Stern [14] (see also Bellare and Neven [3] ), considers a restricted class of algorithms A where n = 1. The lemma involves an execution of a forking algorithm FA which runs A on random f ∈ Ω, and if f ∈ S then it runs A again, on random f ′ chosen subject to the constraint that f
). We say that algorithm FA has a forking success if both f and f ′ are in S, Ind(f ′ ) = Ind(f ), and h ′ j = hj . The forking lemma lower-bounds the probability of FA's forking success in the above experiment by (ǫ − 1/q) 2 /q h (see lemma 1 in [3] ). A common application of this lemma is to ROM-based NIZK's created via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, where value φj in A's output is a pair (xj, πj) where xj is an instance of a language membership problem L and πj = (aj, hj, zj ) is a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof for xj ∈ L, with hj = H(xj, aj) playing the role of a verifier's challenge. A successful forking algorithm outputs two such proofs involving the same instance xj, the same prover's first message aj , and different challenges hj = h ′ j , which for many proof systems allows for efficient extraction of a witness for xj in L.
We describe this generalized forking process as algorithm GFA, whereǫ denotes the expected value of ǫ for adversary A(par) when par is uniformly chosen.
Algorithm GFA on inputs par: 
Then algorithm GFA(par) has a forking success (i.e. outputs two n-element lists (X, X ′ )) with probability frk ≥ǫ/8, where probability goes over coins of IG and GFA.
Note that if the running time of A(par) is bounded above by t(par) then the running time of GFA(par) is at most t(par) * 8n 2 q h /ǫ * ln(8n/ǫ). Hence the expected running time of GFA(par) over all par is bounded above by the expected running time of A(par) multiplied by 8n 2 q h /ǫ * ln(8n/ǫ). In the proof we will rely on the following version of the "splitting lemma" of [14] . Let A, B, S ⊆ X × Y be any sets s.
LEMMA 2. [Splitting Lemma]
For all A, B, S as above:
Inequality (2) PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Let ǫ(par) and frk(par) be the success probability of A and GF A for fixed input par.
Let P be the set of all possible par and P ′ be the set of par satisfying ǫ(par) >ǫ/2. We will argue that for an input par ∈ P ′ , frk(par) ≥ ǫ(par)/4. Then we have
where the last inequality follows because par / ∈ P ′ implies that ǫ(par) ≤ǫ/2
Fix an input instance par ∈ P ′ and let ǫ = ǫ(par) and frk = frk(par). For f ∈ S define i-Ind(f ) as the i-th element of Ind(f ). Let E = E1 ∩ E2 ∩ ... ∩ En where Ei's are defined as follows:
We will argue that frk > ǫ/4 follows from the following inequality:
This is because if
.., jn}. Therefore, for each i from 1 to n, by definition of Bj i , the probability that f ′ chosen in line 5.2.2 satisfies f ′ ∈ Aj i (and hence ji ∈ Ind(f ′ )) is at least ǫ/2nq h . Since the probability that h ′ j i = hj i is at most 1/q <ǫ/8nq h < ǫ/4nq h , the probability that condition in line 5.2.4 is satisfied is at least ǫ/4nq h . Since ǫ >ǫ/2, the probability that all 8nq h /ǫ * ln(8n/ǫ) executions of loop 5.2 fail (for any given i) is at most ǫ/4n. By the union bound, the probability that the rewinding procedure in step 5 fails for some i is thus at most ǫ/4. Hence, the probability frk that GFA succeeds is at least the probability that f ∈ E ⊆ S and that the procedure in step 5 does not fail, which is at least ǫ/2 − ǫ/4 = ǫ/4.
It remains to show that (2) holds. We will first argue:
It's easy to see that (3) implies (2) (see explanations below):
Step (6) follows by the union bound while step (8) follows from inequality (3).
Thus it remains to argue that (3) holds. Let us define the following:
, and vice versa, which implies:
The following sequence of inequalities implies (3) and hence concludes the proof (see the explanations below):
) (12)
Equality (10) follows from (9) and the fact that sets A i j ∩ Bj partition set Ei into q h non-intersecting subsets. Inequality (11) 
MULTIPLICATIVELY HOMOMORPHIC EQUIVOCABLE COMMITMENTS
Commitments: We model a commitment scheme C in common reference string (CRS) model as a tuple of probabilistic poly-time algorithms CSetup, CGen, Com and Open, s.t.
• cpar ← CSetup(1 κ ) on input the security parameter κ, generates public parameters cpar, which also determine the commitment message space M.
• K ← CGen(cpar), on input the parameters cpar, generates a commitment key K .
• (c, d) ← ComK (m) generates the commitment c and decommitment d on message m ∈ M.
• {0, 1} ← OpenK (c, d, m) determines if d is a valid decommitment of commitment c to message m.
These algorithms must satisfy a correctness requirement, namely if
A commitment scheme must also satisfy requirements of hiding and binding. Below we define a statistical notion of hiding and a computational notion of binding since these are the variants of these notions which our scheme satisfies. ǫ-Hiding: For every cpar ← CSetup(1 κ ), m0, m1 ∈ M, and K ← CGen(cpar), there is less than ǫ statistical difference between distributions of c's output by ComK (m0) and ComK (m1). A commitment scheme is perfectly hiding if ǫ = 0. (t, ǫ)-Binding: For any A running in time t and any cpar ← CSetup(1 κ ) the probability of the following event is less than ǫ:
where (c, d0, d1, m0, m1) ← A(K ), K ← CGen(cpar) and probability goes over coins of CGen and A.
Homomorphic Commitments: To enable aggregation of outputs produced by n players into a single short multisignature, our commitment scheme must itself support aggregation. This is possible if the commitment scheme is homomorphic. We call a commitment scheme homomorphic for operation ⊗m : M × M → Restricted Equivocability: A commitment scheme is equivocable if there exists an efficient simulator that generates the commitment key K , indistinguishable from the real key, together with a trapdoor td. The trapdoor allows the simulator to create fake commitments which are indistinguishable from the real ones, but the simulator can later decommit them to any message. As far as we know, no commitment scheme has been proposed that is equivocable and multiplicatively homomorphic at the same time. Pedersen commitment is equivocable but only additively homomorphic, and while the commitment scheme based on ElGamal encryption is multiplicatively homomorphic, it is perfectly binding, and hence not equivocable (like every commitment scheme implemented with standard public-key encryption). Here we do not create such commitment scheme either. Instead we show a simple scheme which is multiplicatively homomorphic and has restricted equivocability in the sense that the simulator can open its fake commitments only to messages of certain special form. Namely, we'll show a multiplicatively homomorphic commitment scheme on M = G, s.t. for any elements g, y in G/{1}, the simulator can open its fake commitment to a message of the form m = g α (y) β , given any β in Zq which the simulator receives after creating the fake commitment. Moreover, while value α can be chosen by the simulator after it receives β, the distribution of α's outputted by the simulator must be indistinguishable from the uniform distribution in Zq. Looking ahead, this type of restricted equivocability is enough to enable straight-line simulation of a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPK) of discrete logarithm DLg(y) (see section 4.2 below). This ZKPK is a basic building block of any multisignature based on DL, and the straight-line simulatable and aggregatable version of this proof system, enabled by our restricted-equivocable and multiplicatively homomorphic commitment scheme, leads to a multisignature scheme with fewer rounds and exact security matching that of standard discrete-log based signatures. Formally, we model this type of restricted equivocability as follows. Let f be a family of efficiently computable functions indexed by the commitment parameter cpar, fcpar : D×D×S → M where D and S, like M, are defined by cpar. We call a commitment scheme ǫ-equivocable for function (family) f if there exist efficient algorithms tdCGen, tdCom and RstEqv, where tdCGen(cpar, y * )
for any cpar outputted by CSetup and any y * ∈ S the following two properties hold: First, there is at most ǫ statistical difference between the distribution of K values output by CGen(cpar) and by tdCGen(cpar, y * ). Second, for all (K , td) ← tdCGen(cpar, y * ) and β ∈ D, the following two distributions are identical:
DL-Based Commitment Scheme
We describe a commitment scheme denoted CS, which is multiplicatively homomorphic on message space a multiplicative group G of prime order q, perfectly hiding, computationally binding under the DL assumption, and equivocable for function fg : Zq × Zq × G/{1} → G, fg(α, β, y * ) = g α (y * ) β . The scheme has features of both Pedersen Commitment and ElGamal encryption:
• CSetup(1 κ ): Set cpar ← g, where g generates group G of prime order q large enough so that the DL assumption in group G holds with security parameter κ. To simplify notation we will assume that group G and its order q are implicitly defined by g.
• CGen(g): Pick y r ← G/{1} and α1, α2
, and K ← (g, h, y, z).
• ComK (m): Pick r1, r2 r ← Zq and return (c, d) where c = (g r 1 h r 2 , y r 1 z r 2 m) and d = (r1, r2).
•
• tdCGen(cpar, y * ): Pick γ r ← Zq and γ1, γ2
and z = (y * ) γ 2 . Set K ← (g, h, y, z) and td ← (y * , γ, γ1, γ2), and return (K , td).
• tdComK (td): Pick r, a, b
• RstEqv K (td, st, β): Compute r2 = γ2 −1 (b − β), r1 = r − γr2, and α = a − r1γ1 (all modulo q), and return (d, α) whered = (r1, r2). Note that r1, r2, α satisfy the following set of equations mod q: We argue the claimed security properties:
Perfect Hiding: Note that the commitment produced by ComK on m = y τ is a pair (g r 1 +α 1 r 2 , y r 1 +α 2 r 2 +τ ), and note that this is a pair of random elements in G × G for every τ if α1 = α2 and (r1, r2) r ← Zq × Zq.
Computational Binding:
The commitment scheme CS is (t, ǫ)-binding if the DL problem in G is (t, ǫ)-hard. Indeed, an attacker A on binding can be used to solve the DL problem as follows: Given the DL challenge (g, h), the reduction picks y, z r ← G s.t. DLg(y) = DL h (z), and runs A(g, h, y, z). By assumption, with probability ǫ,
it follows that y ∆r 1 z ∆r 2 = m ′ /m and g ∆r 1 h ∆r 2 = 1. Therefore, either ∆r1 = ∆r2 = 0 or DLg (h) = −∆r1/∆r2. But ∆r1 = ∆r2 = 0 implies that y ∆r 1 z ∆r 2 = 1 and hence m = m ′ . Thus, if m = m ′ , DLg (h) can be computed as −∆r1/∆r2.
Multiplicative Homomorphism:
The commitment scheme CS is multiplicatively homomorphic on M = G. Operators ⊗ and ⊕ are defined as follows: If c = (c1, c2) and c ′ = (c
Restricted Equivocability: The commitment scheme CS is (2/q)-equivocable for function fg : Zq × Zq × G/{1} → G, where fg(α, β, y * ) = g α (y * ) β . First note that the statistical difference between the distribution of keys K = (g, h, y, z) produced by CGen(g) and tdCGen(g, y * ) is at most 2/q, because elements h and y are distributed identically in both cases, while z in CGen is random in G subject to the constraint DLg(h) = DLy(z), and in tdCGen it is a random generator of G. It remains to argue that for every g ∈ G, y * ∈ G/{1}, every K output by tdCGen(g, y * ), and every β ∈ Zq, triple (c, d, α) in distribution (14) is distributed identically to triple (c,d, α) in distribution (15) . First note that commitment c is a deterministic function of d and m, and hence, for every g, y * , β, it's a deterministic function of (d, α) because m = g α (y * ) β . The fake decommitmentc is determined by the same function of (d, α). Therefore we only need to argue that (d, α) and (d, α) part of these two distributions are identically distributed. First note that (d, α) = (r1, r2, α) in the first distribution is uniform in (Zq) 3 . We therefore need to argue that the same is true about (d, α) = (r1, r2, α) in the second distribution. The reason this holds is that for every g ∈ G, y * ∈ G/{1}, every γ, γ1, γ2 chosen by tdCGen(g, y * ), and every β ∈ Zq, algorithm RstEqv assigns a unique triple (r1, r2, α) to every triple (a, b, r), i.e. (r1, r2, α) = F (a, b, r) where F is a permutation on (Zq) 3 . Since (a, b, r) is chosen uniformly in (Zq) 3 by tdCom, (r1, r2, α) outputted by RstEqv is uniform in (Zq) 3 as well.
Aggregatable ZKPK of DL with Straight-Line Simulation
Three Round HVZK PK of DL: Let G be a prime order group of order q and let g be a generator of G. An honest verifier zero knowledge (HVZK) proof of knowledge (PK) of DL of a group element y ∈ G/{1}, denoted by (a, e, s) can be performed by the following protocol: The prover picks k r ← Zq and computes the first message a = g k ; The verifier picks the challenge e r ← Zq and sends it to the prover; The prover computes the response s = ex + k where x = DLg(y); Finally the verifier accepts iff g s = ay e . For the purpose of subsequent discussion we briefly recall that this proof system is HVZK because for any challenge e a simulator can pick the response s uniformly in Zq and compute the first message a as g s y −e , and it is a proof of knowledge because x = DLg(y) can be computed from two accepting transcripts (a, e, s) and (a, e ′ , s ′ ) where e ′ = e (such two related transcripts can be achieved by
Straight-Line Simulatable ZK Argument of Knowledge of DL in the CRS Model:
Using the restricted equivocable commitment scheme like CS, one can compile the HVZK PK of DL described above into a three round proof system which is an argument of knowledge of DL and which allows for straight-line simulation in the CRS model of any number of proof system instances executed on a single statement, known beforehand to the simulator. This is a severe restriction in general, but it is sufficient in multisignature application where the simulator needs to simulate the action of just one honest player. Our compilation adopts the technique of Damgard [7] to a commitment scheme which is not fully equivocable, but equivocabile enough to allow straight-line simulation of this particular proof if the commitment key is formed using the single statement on which the proof system will be simulated. Let C=(CGen, Com, Open, tdCGen, tdCom, RstEqv) be a commitment scheme for public parameter cpar = g with the message space group G generated by g. Assume C is (tB, ǫB)-binding and ǫE-equivocable for function fcpar : Zq × Zq × G/{1} → G where 1. Setup(1 κ ): Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order q, where the DL assumption holds with security parameter κ and let g be a generator of G. Run CGen on input g to obtain the commitment key K and set hash functions G : G 2 → Zq and H : G × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → Zq. The public parameter is par = (g, G, q, K ).
KGen(par):
Player Pi picks his (ski, pki, πi) tuple as follows:
Pick xi r ← Zq, compute yi ← g x i and set pki ← yi, ski ← xi; Construct a "proof of possession" of xi which is a NIZK proof of knowledge of xi = DLg(yi):
Pick k r ← Zq, set e ← G(yi, g k ), s ← k + exi (mod q) and πi ← (s, e);
3. KVrfy(par, pk, π): Let pk = y and π = (s, e) ; If e = G(y, g s y −e ) then accept otherwise reject. . Let (a, e, s) be a three round HVZK of PK of DL of a group element y ∈ G/{1}. The compilation is as follows: The CRS is the instance of the restricted equivocable commitment scheme. The prover computes (c, d) ← ComK (a) and sends commitment c to the verifier. The verifier picks the challenge e ∈ Zq and sends it back to the prover. The prover responds with s accompanied by a and the decommitment d. The verifier accepts iff g s = ay e and Open K (c, d, a) = 1. This proof system is straightline simulatable: The simulator runs tdCGen(cpar) to obtain K and the trapdoor td. It then computes (c, st) ← tdComK (td) and sends c to the verifier. Upon receiving the challenge, e, the simulator uses the restricted equivocability property of the commitment scheme to open the fake commitment c to a first message a such that the corresponding (a, e, s) be an accepting conversation of three round HVZK PK of DLg(y) by computing (d, s) ← RstEqv K (td, st, e). The simulator sends to the verifier a = g s y −e , d and s. Since the commitment scheme is ǫE-equivocable for function fcpar(α, β, y) = g α y β , thus the view of the verifier communicating with the simulator and the view of the verifier in the real protocol is at most ǫE apart. This proof system is also a computational proof of knowledge based on DL assumption: In the usual fashion the extractor can run the prover twice on same randomness but different challenges e ′ = e, getting with high-enough probability two related transcripts (c, e, (a, s, d) ) and (c, e
Protocol
′ , a ′ ) = 1. If a = a ′ then this is an attack against the binding property of the commitment scheme (and hence also against the DL assumption), and if a = a ′ then g s = ay e and g
, and so the extractor can compute the witness DLg(y) = (s − s ′ )(e − e ′ ) −1 .
DL-BASED MULTISIGNATURE IN THE KEY VERIFICATION MODEL
We show a two-round multisignature scheme MS1 (figure 2) secure under the Discrete Logarithm assumption in the Key Verification model. The MS1 scheme relies on a commitment scheme C = (CGen, Com, Open, tdCGen, tdCom, RstEqv) which is exactly like scheme CS of section 4.1, i.e. multiplicatively homomorphic on message space G and equivocable for function fg(α, β, y) = g α y β . When instantiated with CS, the scheme MS1 requires just three exponentiations per party for signing and two for verification, and it is secure under the DL assumption, with reduction efficiency matching those for standard DL-based signatures. The length of the resulting multisignature is 4|q| bits, because the commitment can be recomputed from the message and the decommitment. The novelty of scheme MS1 is that it achieves O(1)-cost verification in the KV model based on only the DL assumption while using short proofs of key well-formedness, |πi| = 2|q|, each taking just 1 exponentiation to verify. In contrast, the combined results of [12] and [9] imply a DL-based KV-model multisignature with O(1) multisignature verification but with significantly more expensive proofs, and the scheme is either three rounds (and hence is less practical) or has worse exact security (and no concurrent security). The key tool enabling the security proof below is the generalized forking lemma of section 3.
, and multiplicatively homomorphic on group G, then multisignature scheme MS1 instantiated with C is (t, ǫ, n, qs, q h )-secure in the random oracle model where
and tsign is the time required for signing by each party.
PROOF. Let C = (CGen, Com, Open, tdCGen, tdCom, RstEqv) be a commitment scheme for public parameters cpar = g and the message space M equal to G generated by g. Assume C is multiplicatively homomorphic, (tB, ǫB)-binding and ǫE-equivocable for function fcpar : Zq × Zq × G/{1} → G where fcpar(α, β, y) = Init:
Construct a "proof of possession" of x1 which is a simulated NIZK proof of knowledge of DLg (y1):
] ← e; π1 ← (s, e); Execute F on input (par, pk1, π1);
SimMSign(m):
1. (c, st) ← tdComK (td); c1 ←c; Send (y1, c1) to F; 2. Upon receiving (yj , cj) for all Pj ∈ P, do c ← AE
SimHash: Upon receiving a valid forgery (m, σ, {(pki, πi)}i=2..n) from F, parse σ = (s, e, c, d) and pki = yi and πi = (si, ei) for i = 2, ..., n; Compute y = É n i=1 yi and query H on (y, c, m) and G on (yi, g s i y −e i ) for i = 2..n. Return (J, {φj}j∈J ) where J = {j0, j2, j3..., jn} and j0 is the index of e in the hash table H and φj 0 = (m, σ) and for i = 2..n, ji's are the indices of ei's in the hash table G and φj i = (yi, πi). interacting with the forger F. B0 takes as an input a set {e1, ..., eq h } where ei's are in Zq and runs Setup procedure to obtain par and follows the real protocol (i.e. procedures KGen and MSign) on behalf of the honest player. Additionally, B0 answers the forger's hash queries and performs an extra finalization process by following procedures SimHash and Finalize in figure 3 . The simulator B1, on the other hand, takes as an input a DL challenge y1 ∈ G/{1} and a set {e1, ..., eq h } where ei's are in Zq and follows the Init, SimMSign, SimHash and Finalize procedures detailed in figure 3 to perform the initialization, answering to signature queries, answering to hash queries and finalization processes, respectively. Intuitively, the simulator B1 embeds the DL challenge in the public key of the honest player and utilizes the (restricted) equivocability property of the commitment scheme C to simulate the signature protocol on behalf of the honest player. Both B0 and B1, after receiving a valid forgery from F, perform a finalization phase in which the message-forged-multisignature pair and the public-key -forged-POP pairs are returned together with the set of indices of the hash responses upon which they are based. Namely both B0 and B1 return (J, {φj}j∈J ) s.t. if we denote J = {j0, j2, j3..., jn}, φ0 = (m, σ) and for all i = 2..n, φi = (yi, πi) then the following equations hold:
Vrfy(par, m, {y1, y2, ..., yn}, σ) = 1 (17) ∀i = 2..n : KVrfy(par, yi, πi) = 1
The simulators B0 and B1 set up empty tables G and H to simulate the hash functions G and H, and use the set {e1, ..., eq h } to answer the hash queries. (This convention makes it easy to use the generalized forking lemma in relation to B0 and B1.) Consider GF B l , the forking algorithm associated with simulator B l for either l = 0 or l = 1. The success event of GF B l denoted by E B l is that the algorithm GF B l outputs X l = {ej, φj}
j∈J , and ej =ẽj for all j ∈ J, where J = {j0, j2, j3, ..., jn} is the set of indices of the hash responses participating in the forgery produced by the first execution of B l as run by GF B l . Thus according to the Finalize process in figure  3 , φj 0 = (m, (s, ej 0 , c, d)),φj 0 = (m, (s,ẽj 0 ,c,d)) and for i = 2..n, φj i = (yi, (si, ej i )) andφj i = (ỹi, (si,ẽj i )). Since for i = 0 and every i = 2..n, the random coins and the hash responses of the algorithm B l previous to j th i query is the same in the first execution and the execution leading to the addition of (ẽj i ,φj i ) toX l , all the computations and communications and in particular the queries submitted to the hash functions H and G before j 2 in which E B l happens and
On the other hand according to the generalized forking lemma, E B l can be lower bounded by ǫB l , the success probability of the simulator B l :
If ej's are uniformly distributed in Zq then F's view in interaction with B0 is identical to the real execution of the protocol. As for B1, P1's public key and proof of possession of secret key, (y1, π1), is distributed as in the real execution of the protocol. This is because y1 is uniform in G and π1 is uniform in Z 2 q . Since C is ǫE-equivocable, by definition, the distributions of the commitment keys in the simulation and the real execution have at most ǫE statistical difference and additionally, the distribution of the tuples (c1, d1, s1) generated in each signature instance in the interaction between F and B1 is identical to the distribution of the same variables in the real execution. Thus, since our simulation is straightline, total statistical distance between F's view in interaction with B1 and in real execution is at most ǫE. This implies in particular that ǫB 0 = ǫ, |ǫB 1 − ǫ| ≤ ǫE and | Pr[E
Thus equation (19) becomes:
The actual reduction algorithm R, runs both GF B 0 and GF B 1 . If E1 B 1 happens, then g s y −e j 0 = gsỹ −ẽ j 0 and since y =ỹ and ej 0 =ẽj 0 thus
Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order q, where the DL assumption holds with security parameter κ and let g be a generator of G. Run CGen on input g to obtain the commitment key K and set the hash function H : G × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → Zq. The public parameter is par = (g, G, q, K ).
KGen(par):
Pick xi r ← Zq, compute yi ← g x i and set pki ← yi, ski ← xi and πi to the empty string.
3. KVrfy(par, pk, π): Since the scheme is in the plain model, KVrfy just returns true. Vrfy(par, m, {pk1, pk2, . .., pkn}, σ):
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5.
Parse σ as (s, A, c, d) and each pki as yi. For i = 1, 2, ..., n, set ei ← H (yi, c, {y1, y2, ..., yn}, m) . and ej i =ẽj i , thus the DL's for all yi's where i ∈ {2, ..., n} can be computed as DLg(yi) = (si − si)(ej i −ẽj i ) −1 . Thus R can compute DLg(y1) by setting
If E2 B 0 happens, then R immediately translates it into an attack against the binding property of the commitment scheme C by outputting (c, d,d, g s y −e j 0 , gsy −ẽ j 0 ). To see this note that as argued before, y =ỹ, c =c and since E2 B 0 occurred, thus g s y −e j 0 = gsy −ẽ j 0 and due to validity of the forgeries we have
Moreover the commitment key K is output by CGen in the execution of B0.
Thus Pr[E
The running time tR of the reduction algorithm R is equal to (8n 2 q h /ǫ) ln(8n/ǫ) times the maximum of running time of the algorithms B0 and B1. But the running time of B0 and B1 is dominated by the running time of the forger F plus the time spent by the simulators to answer the hash and signing queries. Thus tR ≤ (8n 2 q h /ǫ) ln(8n/ǫ)(t + qstsign) where tsign is the maximum time spent by the simulators B0 and B1 to answer one signature query. On the other hand since R either answers the DL challenge or outputs an attack against the binding property of the commitment C, it must be true that min(t ′ , tB) ≤ tR. Thus:
The corollary below follows by setting ǫE = 2/q, tB = t ′ and ǫB = ǫ ′ , assuming that double-exponentiation is only 20% more expensive than single exponentiation. and texp is the time of one exponentiation in G.
DL-BASED MULTISIGNATURE IN THE PLAIN MODEL
We show a two-round multisignature scheme MS2 (figure 4) secure under the DL assumption in the Plain Public Key model. The MS2 scheme relies on a commitment scheme C = (CGen, Com, Open, tdCGen, tdCom, RstEqv) with the same properties as were required by the MS1 scheme of section 4.2, i.e. a commitment scheme which is multiplicatively homomorphic and equivocable for function fg(α, β, y) = g α y β . When instantiated with the commitment scheme CS of section 4, multisignature MS2 is secure under the DL assumption in the plain model, the signing procedure requiring three exponentiations per player, and the resulting multisignature takes 4|q| bits. The multisignature verification takes O(n) exponentiations, as in the previous DL-based multisignature in the plain model of [3] , but the new protocol requires only two rounds instead of three. The exact security we show for this scheme matches that of [3] , and indeed matches the exact security bounds shown for standard DL-based signatures. THEOREM 5. If the DL problem is (t ′ , ǫ ′ )-hard in group G then the multisignature scheme MS2 insantiated with a commitment scheme parameterized with g that is (tB, ǫB)-binding, ǫE-equivocable for function fg : Zq × Zq × G/{1} → G, fg(α, β, y) = g α y β , and multiplicatively homomorphic on G, is (t, ǫ, n, qs, q h )-secure in random oracle model where ǫ ≤ 8(ǫ ′ + ǫB) + 9ǫE t ≥ ǫ 8q h ln(8/ǫ) min(t ′ , tB) − qstsign and tsign is the time required for signing by each party.
Init:
(td, K ) ← tdCGen(g, y1); ctr ← 1; par ← (g, H, K ); pk1 ← y1; Execute F on input (par, pk1, );
1. (c, st) ← tdComK (td); c1 ←c; Send (c1, y1) to F;
2. Upon receiving (cj , yj) for all Pj ∈ P, do c ← AE P j ∈P cj ; pkSet ← {yi}P i ∈P ; e1 ← H(y1, c, pkSet, m); (d, α) ← RstEqv K (td, st, e1); s1 ← α; d1 ←d; A1 ← g The proof is similar to the proof of theorem 3 and relies on the simulator depicted in figure 5 . However it uses an interesting technique to respond to the hash functions that enables the use of the generalized forking lemma to extract the DL of the challenge in plain model. More precisely, in order to use the generalized forking lemma to extract DLg(y1) from several executions of the forger within the general forking algorithm, we need firstly that the public key set output as part of the forgery should be the same in these executions and secondly, certain random oracle responses need to be the same in these executions of the forger even though the corresponding queries may not occur until after the fork. To address the first issue, the set of public keys, pkSet, is also included in the hash query to H and to address the second issue, we assign the responses to all queries of the form (y, c, pkSet, m) where y ∈ pkSet when the first query of that type comes. To have a better idea about how our algorithm for answering the hash queries works imagine simulating the hash function as a table whose rows are indexed by (c, pkSet, m) and whose columns are indexed by y. The hash response to query (y, c, pkSet, m) is H[(y, (c, pkSet, m))]. To answer query (y, c, pkSet, m), if y, y1 ∈ pkSet then for all yi ∈ pkSet we assign values to entries indexed by (yi, (c, pkSet, m)). If y / ∈ pkSet or y1 / ∈ pkSet, then forgery cannot be built and we answer the query with a random value. All the entries indexed by (y1, c, pkSet, m) where y1 ∈ pkSet are assigned from the set {e1, ..., eq h } in answering to hash queries so that we can use the generalized forking lemma as formulated in section 3.
